In this article we study an extension of the vector balancing game investigated by Spencer and Olson (which corresponds to the on-line version of the discrepancy problem for matrices). We assume that decisions in earlier rounds become less and less important as the game continues. For an aging param
Vector Balancing Games with Aging
β Scribed by Benjamin Doerr
- Publisher
- Elsevier Science
- Year
- 2001
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 176 KB
- Volume
- 10
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 1571-0653
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π SIMILAR VOLUMES
We consider a two person perfect information game with a buffer. On each n < < < < round, Player I selects a vector Β¨g β«ήβ¬ with Β¨F 1, where ΠΈ is the l -norm, and 2 Player II can either put the vector in the buffer or choose a sign β s "1 for a i given vector Β¨. There are no more than d vectors that
## Abstract Historical. The topic of games with vector payoffs is one which could be expected to attract attention on the basis of its intrinsic interest. However, the history of the particular problem treated in Dr. Shapley's paper was not of this kind and m a y have some interest of its own. Duri