On balanced games and games with committee control
β Scribed by I. Curiel; J. Derks; S. Tijs
- Publisher
- Springer
- Year
- 1989
- Tongue
- German
- Weight
- 449 KB
- Volume
- 11
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0171-6468
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
π SIMILAR VOLUMES
In this article we study an extension of the vector balancing game investigated by Spencer and Olson (which corresponds to the on-line version of the discrepancy problem for matrices). We assume that decisions in earlier rounds become less and less important as the game continues. For an aging param
We consider a two person perfect information game with a buffer. On each n < < < < round, Player I selects a vector Β¨g β«ήβ¬ with Β¨F 1, where ΠΈ is the l -norm, and 2 Player II can either put the vector in the buffer or choose a sign β s "1 for a i given vector Β¨. There are no more than d vectors that