In this article we study an extension of the vector balancing game investigated by Spencer and Olson (which corresponds to the on-line version of the discrepancy problem for matrices). We assume that decisions in earlier rounds become less and less important as the game continues. For an aging param
Balancing Game with a Buffer
β Scribed by Hua Peng; Catherine Huafei Yan
- Publisher
- Elsevier Science
- Year
- 1998
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 145 KB
- Volume
- 21
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0196-8858
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β¦ Synopsis
We consider a two person perfect information game with a buffer. On each n < < < < round, Player I selects a vector Β¨g β«ήβ¬ with Β¨F 1, where ΠΈ is the l -norm, and 2 Player II can either put the vector in the buffer or choose a sign β s "1 for a i given vector Β¨. There are no more than d vectors that can be put in the buffer. i < < Player II's object is to keep the cumulative sum Γ β Β¨as small as possible. We i i prove that the value of the game goes to infinity if d F n y 2. We give an upper bound of the value if d G n y 1. The same results hold for a generalized problem.
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