Professor Cooter deals with the issue of explaining the behavior of judges, an issue of some interest to those of us who claim that economics can be used to explain the result of the common-law process. While there are some answers to this question in the literature (e.g., Rubin, 1977;Priest, 1977;a
The objectives of private and public judges
โ Scribed by Chester S. Spatt
- Publisher
- Springer US
- Year
- 1983
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 139 KB
- Volume
- 41
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0048-5829
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
โฆ Synopsis
The objectives of private and public judges A comment* CHESTER S. SPATT** Cooter analyzes settlements and judicial decisions in an environment in which the parties have private information about their preferences. Consideration of asymmetric information has yielded powerful insights into a variety of market settings so it seems natural to apply the analysis to the law.
In analyzing problems with private information all economic agents are assumed to optimize, given their information. The appropriate welfare criterion to apply to such models is one of constrained optimality (for example, see Harris and Townsend [ 1981 ] ). Loosely, this notion refers to optimality relative to both the usual feasibility restrictions and informational constraints generated from the information structure. In many situations the standard full information optimal does not satisfy the informational constraints and, therefore, cannot be constrained optimal. Several of Cooter's observations ignore the role of * Stimulating conversations with Vinee Crawford and Tom Paltrey and the support of the National Science Foundation are gratefully acknowledged.
๐ SIMILAR VOLUMES
## Abstract As a baseline for evaluation and assessment, an interdisciplinary cohort of graduate students collaboratively identifies and explicates the central concepts and objectives of public scholarship in this chapter.