The objectives of private and public judges A comment\* CHESTER S. SPATT\*\* Cooter analyzes settlements and judicial decisions in an environment in which the parties have private information about their preferences. Consideration of asymmetric information has yielded powerful insights into a variet
The objectives of private and public judges
โ Scribed by Paul H. Rubin
- Publisher
- Springer US
- Year
- 1983
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 180 KB
- Volume
- 41
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0048-5829
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
โฆ Synopsis
Professor Cooter deals with the issue of explaining the behavior of judges, an issue of some interest to those of us who claim that economics can be used to explain the result of the common-law process. While there are some answers to this question in the literature (e.g., Rubin, 1977;Priest, 1977;and Goodman, 1978) which are based on the behavior of litigants rather than of judges, Professor Cooter has elsewhere rejected these answers (Cooter and Kornhauser, 1980) and is thus left with a puzzle. In this paper, he adapts his theory of bargaining breakdowns to the selection of judges and provides an answer to the question.
The answer which he provides is in two parts; first, judges want to maximize their case load; second, they will accomplish this by providing efficient decisions in disputes which come before them. The answer is ingenious, and is indeed the sort of answer which we should seek. However, I dO not think that this particular solution is completely correct, and it is not very different from those solutions which he rejects. I will discuss each part in turn.
๐ SIMILAR VOLUMES
## Abstract As a baseline for evaluation and assessment, an interdisciplinary cohort of graduate students collaboratively identifies and explicates the central concepts and objectives of public scholarship in this chapter.