✦ LIBER ✦

The kernel, the bargaining set and the reduced game

✍ Scribed by C. Chang; C. Y. Kan

Publisher: Springer-Verlag
Year: 1992
Tongue: English
Weight: 329 KB
Volume: 21
Category: Article
ISSN: 0020-7276
DOI: 10.1007/bf01240253

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

📜 SIMILAR VOLUMES

The kernel and bargaining set for convex

The kernel and bargaining set for convex games

✍ M. Maschler; B. Peleg; L. S. Shapley 📂 Article 📅 1971 🏛 Springer-Verlag 🌐 English ⚖ 967 KB

The bargaining set in voting games

✍ Norman Schofield 📂 Article 📅 1980 🏛 John Wiley and Sons 🌐 English ⚖ 704 KB

Equivalence between bargaining sets and

Equivalence between bargaining sets and the core in simple games

✍ Ezra Einy; David Wettstein 📂 Article 📅 1996 🏛 Springer-Verlag 🌐 English ⚖ 355 KB

The reactive bargaining set of some flow

The reactive bargaining set of some flow games and of superadditive simple games

✍ Daniel Granot; Frieda Granot; Weiping R. Zhu 📂 Article 📅 1997 🏛 Springer-Verlag 🌐 English ⚖ 413 KB

A test of the Core, Bargaining Set, Kern

A test of the Core, Bargaining Set, Kernel and Shapley models inn-person quota games with one weak player

✍ Abraham D. Horowitz 📂 Article 📅 1977 🏛 Springer US 🌐 English ⚖ 682 KB

n-person (n -1)-quota-games where the quotas are positive for certain n -1 (strong) players and negative for the remaining (weak) player, are discussed. Normative solutions predicted by the Core,the Kernel, the Bargaining Set, the Competitive Bargaining Set, and by the Shapley Value are presented an

An arbitration game and the egalitarian

An arbitration game and the egalitarian bargaining solution

✍ Walter Bossert; Guofu Tan 📂 Article 📅 1995 🏛 Springer 🌐 English ⚖ 829 KB

We analyze a simple arbitration procedure which is a multi-stage variant of Nash's demand game. In the absence of discounting, all Nash equilibria of the game yield the egalitarian solution in the first stage. The crucial feature of our arbitration procedure is that, in the case of incompatible dema