A test of the Core, Bargaining Set, Kernel and Shapley models inn-person quota games with one weak player
✍ Scribed by Abraham D. Horowitz
- Publisher
- Springer US
- Year
- 1977
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 682 KB
- Volume
- 8
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0040-5833
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
✦ Synopsis
n-person (n -1)-quota-games where the quotas are positive for certain n -1 (strong) players and negative for the remaining (weak) player, are discussed. Normative solutions predicted by the Core,the Kernel, the Bargaining Set, the Competitive Bargaining Set, and by the Shapley Value are presented and exemplified.
Each of twelve groups of subjects participated in a four-person and a five-person (n -1)quota games with one weak player. The weak player was always excluded from the ratified coalition. The division of payoffs among the strong players was more egalitarian than the Kernel solution but less egalitarian than the Shapley value. The Core and the Bargaining Sets were fully supported for the two strongest players, but less supported for the other players. Analyses of the bargaining process confirmed a dynamic interpretation of the Bargaining Set Theory.