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The reactive bargaining set of some flow games and of superadditive simple games

✍ Scribed by Daniel Granot; Frieda Granot; Weiping R. Zhu

Publisher: Springer-Verlag
Year: 1997
Tongue: English
Weight: 413 KB
Volume: 26
Category: Article
ISSN: 0020-7276
DOI: 10.1007/bf01295849

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