✦ LIBER ✦

The equilibrium set of two-player games with complementarities is a sublattice

✍ Scribed by Federico Echenique

Publisher: Springer
Year: 2003
Tongue: English
Weight: 51 KB
Volume: 22
Category: Article
ISSN: 0938-2259
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-002-0337-0

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

📜 SIMILAR VOLUMES

On the equilibrium payoffs set of two pl

On the equilibrium payoffs set of two player repeated games with imperfect monitoring

✍ E. Lehrer 📂 Article 📅 1992 🏛 Springer-Verlag 🌐 English ⚖ 747 KB

Nash equilibrium in multi-player games w

Nash equilibrium in multi-player games with the choice of time instants and integral cost functionals

✍ S. A. Brykalov; O. N. Golovina; A. V. Kryazhimskii 📂 Article 📅 2007 🏛 Springer US 🌐 English ⚖ 174 KB

A test of the Core, Bargaining Set, Kern

A test of the Core, Bargaining Set, Kernel and Shapley models inn-person quota games with one weak player

✍ Abraham D. Horowitz 📂 Article 📅 1977 🏛 Springer US 🌐 English ⚖ 682 KB

n-person (n -1)-quota-games where the quotas are positive for certain n -1 (strong) players and negative for the remaining (weak) player, are discussed. Normative solutions predicted by the Core,the Kernel, the Bargaining Set, the Competitive Bargaining Set, and by the Shapley Value are presented an

A multistep game of two persons with a “

A multistep game of two persons with a “cautious” second player and the sequential transmission of information

✍ T.N. Danil'chenko; K.K. Mosevich 📂 Article 📅 1974 🏛 Elsevier Science ⚖ 365 KB