On the equilibrium payoffs set of two player repeated games with imperfect monitoring
β Scribed by E. Lehrer
- Publisher
- Springer-Verlag
- Year
- 1992
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 747 KB
- Volume
- 20
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0020-7276
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
π SIMILAR VOLUMES
In this paper, we consider fuzzy matrix games, namely, two-person zero-sum games with fuzzy payo s. Based on fuzzy max order, for such games, we deΓΏne three kinds of concepts of minimax equilibrium strategies and investigate their properties. First, we shall show that these equilibrium strategies ar
n-person (n -1)-quota-games where the quotas are positive for certain n -1 (strong) players and negative for the remaining (weak) player, are discussed. Normative solutions predicted by the Core,the Kernel, the Bargaining Set, the Competitive Bargaining Set, and by the Shapley Value are presented an