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On characterization of equilibrium strategy of two-person zero-sum games with fuzzy payoffs

✍ Scribed by Takashi Maeda


Publisher
Elsevier Science
Year
2003
Tongue
English
Weight
262 KB
Volume
139
Category
Article
ISSN
0165-0114

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✦ Synopsis


In this paper, we consider fuzzy matrix games, namely, two-person zero-sum games with fuzzy payo s. Based on fuzzy max order, for such games, we deΓΏne three kinds of concepts of minimax equilibrium strategies and investigate their properties. First, we shall show that these equilibrium strategies are characterized as Nash equilibrium strategies of a family of parametric bi-matrix games with crisp payo s. Second, we investigate properties of values of fuzzy matrix games by means of possibility and necessity measures. In addition, we give a numerical example to illustrate utility of our approaches.


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Characterization of the Equilibrium Stra
✍ Takashi Maeda πŸ“‚ Article πŸ“… 2000 πŸ› Elsevier Science 🌐 English βš– 107 KB

In this paper, we consider fuzzy bimatrix games, which mean bimatrix games with fuzzy payoff matrices. We define two types of concepts of equilibrium strategy and investigate their relationships. Moreover, we prove that these Nash equilibrium strategies exist in any fuzzy bimatrix games.