The Effect of Leasing versus Buying on Entry Deterrence
β Scribed by Wen Mao; Peter Zaleski
- Publisher
- John Wiley and Sons
- Year
- 2011
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 117 KB
- Volume
- 32
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0143-6570
- DOI
- 10.1002/mde.1537
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
β¦ Synopsis
Models of entry deterrence typically require that incumbents possess a cost advantage as a prerequisite for deterring entry. Potential entrants possess a cost advantage over incumbents, however, if input costs fall over time. This paper models the behavior of an incumbent and a potential entrant when the input cost falls over time and the firms have the option of buying or leasing the input. The model shows that if the future cost savings from new technology exceed the marginal transaction costs of leasing the current equipment, then leasing increases the incumbent's ability to deter entry. Copyright Β© 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.
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