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Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods

✍ Scribed by Bhaskar Dutta; Hans Peters; Arunava Sen

Book ID: 112258288
Publisher: Elsevier Science
Year: 2002
Tongue: English
Weight: 183 KB
Volume: 106
Category: Article
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2896

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