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Maximal domain for strategy-proof probabilistic rules in economies with one public good

✍ Scribed by Shuhei Morimoto

Book ID: 120785771
Publisher: Springer
Year: 2012
Tongue: English
Weight: 584 KB
Volume: 41
Category: Article
ISSN: 0176-1714
DOI: 10.1007/s00355-012-0700-4

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