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Maximal Domain for Strategy-Proof Rules with One Public Good

✍ Scribed by Dolors Berga; Shigehiro Serizawa

Book ID: 112257980
Publisher: Elsevier Science
Year: 2000
Tongue: English
Weight: 250 KB
Volume: 90
Category: Article
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1999.2579

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