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Strategy-proof allocation mechanisms for pure public goods economies when preferences are monotonic

✍ Scribed by Diego Moreno

Publisher: Springer
Year: 1999
Tongue: English
Weight: 270 KB
Volume: 13
Category: Article
ISSN: 0938-2259
DOI: 10.1007/s001990050247

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