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Stable set and voting rules

✍ Scribed by Klaus Kultti; Paavo Miettinen

Publisher
Elsevier Science
Year
2007
Tongue
English
Weight
149 KB
Volume
53
Category
Article
ISSN
0165-4896

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

πŸ“œ SIMILAR VOLUMES

Existence of a β€˜structurally stable’ equ
Existence of a β€˜structurally stable’ equilibrium for a non-collegial voting rule
✍ Norman Schofield πŸ“‚ Article πŸ“… 1986 πŸ› Springer US 🌐 English βš– 801 KB

This essay shows that, for any non-collegial voting rule, ~, there exists an integer, s(tx), with this property: if the policy space, W, has dimension no greater than s(g), then there exists a profile of smooth utilities on IV, such that the core for o at this profile is non-empty and 'structurally

The Pareto rule and strategic voting
The Pareto rule and strategic voting
✍ Ian MacIntyre πŸ“‚ Article πŸ“… 1991 πŸ› Springer US 🌐 English βš– 840 KB

This paper uses a particular choice rule over sets of alternatives under the Pareto rule. Starting from the sincere situation every strategic misrevelation of preference is shown to be an improvement for all voters. The existence of an equilibrium under successive misrepresentations by sincere voter