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Existence of a ‘structurally stable’ equilibrium for a non-collegial voting rule

✍ Scribed by Norman Schofield


Publisher
Springer US
Year
1986
Tongue
English
Weight
801 KB
Volume
51
Category
Article
ISSN
0048-5829

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

✦ Synopsis


This essay shows that, for any non-collegial voting rule, ~, there exists an integer, s(tx), with this property: if the policy space, W, has dimension no greater than s(g), then there exists a profile of smooth utilities on IV, such that the core for o at this profile is non-empty and 'structurally stable' under sufficiently small perturbation. We also show how we may compute s(tx) for an arbitrary rule.


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