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Silent interests and all-pay auctions

✍ Scribed by Kai A. Konrad

Book ID: 116556792
Publisher: Elsevier Science
Year: 2006
Tongue: English
Weight: 182 KB
Volume: 24
Category: Article
ISSN: 0167-7187
DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2005.08.015

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

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