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All–Pay Auctions with Variable Rewards

✍ Scribed by Todd Kaplan; Israel Luski; Aner Sela; David Wettstein

Book ID: 108516365
Publisher: John Wiley and Sons
Year: 2002
Tongue: English
Weight: 146 KB
Volume: 50
Category: Article
ISSN: 0022-1821
DOI: 10.1111/1467-6451.00184

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

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