In this paper we present a formal analysis of rent-seeking for public goods by two or more groups with different numbers of individuals. We begin by considering equally wealthy groups under risk neutrality, a case which constitutes our basic model. Several surprising and interesting results emerge f
โฆ LIBER โฆ
Rent-Seeking for Pure Public Goods
โ Scribed by Eliakim Katz, Shmuel Nitzan and Jacob Rosenberg
- Book ID
- 125298564
- Publisher
- Springer US
- Year
- 1990
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 993 KB
- Volume
- 65
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0048-5829
- DOI
- 10.2307/30025243
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
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