In a recent article, Tullock (1984: 91) makes the point that some political acts are motivated by the public interest -'... the bulk of people voting on any given issue have no particular selfish motive to be concerned with many issues. They will vote in terms of the public interest'. In this view,
Rent-seeking for pure public goods
β Scribed by Eliakim Katz; Shmuel Nitzan; Jacob Rosenberg
- Publisher
- Springer US
- Year
- 1990
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 539 KB
- Volume
- 65
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0048-5829
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
β¦ Synopsis
In this paper we present a formal analysis of rent-seeking for public goods by two or more groups with different numbers of individuals. We begin by considering equally wealthy groups under risk neutrality, a case which constitutes our basic model. Several surprising and interesting results emerge from the analysis of this basic case. The problem is then extended to deal with (a) groups with different wealth levels, and (b) risk aversion. This last extension brings about a further crop of interesting and useful results. * We should like to thank Eliezer Prisman of Bar Ilan University and Barry Smith of York University for their very helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this paper.
π SIMILAR VOLUMES
We characterize strategy-proof social choice functions when individuals have strictly quasi-concave, continuous and satiated utility functions on convex subsets of IR m, representing preferences for the provision of m pure public goods. When specialized to the case m = 1, these assumptions amount to
## Abstract The paper considers various possible means, mooted as alternatives or supplements to a simple schedule of governmental contributions, of paying for global public goods and common purposes: use of IMF Special Drawing Rights (SDRs); the United Kingdom's International Finance Facility (IFF