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The public interest and rent seeking

โœ Scribed by E. C. Pasour


Publisher
Springer US
Year
1985
Tongue
English
Weight
159 KB
Volume
47
Category
Article
ISSN
0048-5829

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โœฆ Synopsis


In a recent article, Tullock (1984: 91) makes the point that some political acts are motivated by the public interest -'... the bulk of people voting on any given issue have no particular selfish motive to be concerned with many issues. They will vote in terms of the public interest'. In this view, political activity is in the public interest if it is not undertaken to directly affect the individual involved. In contrast, resources used in voting, lobbying, and other actions to enhance one's economic position are considered to be rent-seeking waste.

The public interest, as Tullock suggests, undoubtedly is a motive in the political process. However, the effect of a government program is not determined by the motives of those responsible for its establishment. The effect of the U.S. sugar price support program, for example, results in domestic sugar prices being more than double the world price whether or not the motive of those responsible for the program is self-serving. Moreover, it is unlikely that public interest political activities can be identified on the basis of motive since the motive to do good is intermingled with selfish motives for most people (Tullock, 1984: 93). Furthermore, there is no reliable way to know what people's motives are. In the case of the college professor who lobbies, votes, and otherwise works to bring about increased federal support affecting his own research, for example, there is no objective way to determine the importance of the public interest motive. The lobbying and other costs incurred in securing the aid can be considered to be rent-seeking waste if the subsidy represents bad public policy. If increased federal research support is warranted, however, the information and transactions costs necessary to obtain the legislation would be considered waste only if one compares the real world with a "perfect polity" where it is not necessary to incur these costs. 1 The desirability of a public policy doesn't hinge on the motives of the individuals who spend time and money to influence the political process. Public interest political activity (or rent-seeking waste) must instead be determined by the overall desirability of the issue being voted on rather than whether the individual participant in the political process expects to gain.


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