In this paper we present a formal analysis of rent-seeking for public goods by two or more groups with different numbers of individuals. We begin by considering equally wealthy groups under risk neutrality, a case which constitutes our basic model. Several surprising and interesting results emerge f
โฆ LIBER โฆ
Heterogeneous groups and rent-seeking for public goods
โ Scribed by Guillaume Cheikbossian
- Book ID
- 113590977
- Publisher
- Elsevier Science
- Year
- 2008
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 232 KB
- Volume
- 24
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0176-2680
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
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