Referential Opacity and Epistemic Logic
✍ Scribed by Saloua Chatti
- Book ID
- 107509041
- Publisher
- SP Birkhäuser Verlag Basel
- Year
- 2011
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 239 KB
- Volume
- 5
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 1661-8297
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
📜 SIMILAR VOLUMES
REFERENTIAL OPACITY 5 (c) and (d); and if both (e) and ( d ) are false, the falsity of ( 3 ) follows even without the assumption of (1) and (2). But this means that, given (1) and (2), and given Chisholm's analysis of (3), (3) cannot possibly be true. Now to say that if (1) and ( 2) are true, then (
This survey brings together a collection of epistemic logics and discusses their approaches in alleviating the logical omniscience problem. Of particular note is the logic of implicit and explicit belief. Explicit belief refers to information actively held by an agent, while implicit belief refers t
Dubois, D. and H. Prade, Epistemic entrenchment and possibilistic logic (Research Note), Artificial Intelligence 50 (1991) 223-239. This note points out the close relationships existing between recent proposals in the theory of belief revision made by Gardenf6rs based on the notion of epistemic ent
## Abstract It is known that a theory in S5‐epistemic logic with several agents may have numerous models. This is because each such model specifies also what an agent knows about infinite intersections of events, while the expressive power of the logic is limited to finite conjunctions of formulas.