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Epistemic entrenchment and possibilistic logic

✍ Scribed by Didier Dubois; Henri Prade


Publisher
Elsevier Science
Year
1991
Tongue
English
Weight
896 KB
Volume
50
Category
Article
ISSN
0004-3702

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✦ Synopsis


Dubois, D. and H. Prade, Epistemic entrenchment and possibilistic logic (Research Note), Artificial Intelligence 50 (1991) 223-239.

This note points out the close relationships existing between recent proposals in the theory of belief revision made by Gardenf6rs based on the notion of epistemic entrenchment, and possibility theory applied to automated reasoning under uncertainty. It is claimed that the only numerical counterparts of epistemic entrenchment relations are so-called necessity measures that are dual to possibility measures, and are also mathematically equivalent to consonant belief functions in the sense of Sharer. Relationships between Spohn's ordinal conditional functions and possibility theory are also laid bare.


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