Truth-functionality and referential opacity

✍ Scribed by Richard Sharvy

• Book ID: 104747346
• Publisher: Springer Netherlands
• Year: 1970
• Tongue: English
• Weight: 281 KB
• Volume: 21
• Category: Article
• ISSN: 0031-8116
• DOI: 10.1007/bf00375974

✦ Synopsis

REFERENTIAL OPACITY 5 (c) and (d); and if both (e) and ( d ) are false, the falsity of ( 3 ) follows even without the assumption of (1) and (2). But this means that, given (1) and (2), and given Chisholm's analysis of (3), (3) cannot possibly be true. Now to say that if (1) and ( 2) are true, then (3) must be false is certainly to offer a way of not inferring ( 5) from ( 1)-( 4), but this can scarcely constitute a solution to the problem of Leibniz's Law in belief contexts. For one of the main problems is just that (1), (2), and (3) all seem to be true together.