Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Volume 8

✍ Scribed by Karen Bennett (editor), Dean W. Zimmerman (editor)

• Publisher: Oxford University Press
• Year: 2014
• Tongue: English
• Leaves: 388
• Category: Library

✦ Synopsis

Much of the most interesting work in philosophy today is metaphysical in character. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics is a forum for the best new work in this flourishing field. OSM offers a broad view of the subject, featuring not only the traditionally central topics such as existence, identity, modality, time, and causation, but also the rich clusters of metaphysical questions in neighbouring fields, such as philosophy of mind and philosophy of science. Besides independent essays, volumes will often contain a critical essay on a recent book, or a symposium that allows participants to respond to one another's criticisms and questions. Anyone who wants to know what's happening in metaphysics can start here.

✦ Table of Contents

Cover
Oxford Studies in Metaphysics
Copyright
Preface
Contents
The Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Younger Scholar Prize
FINDING THE FUNDAMENTAL
1. Naturalness
1. INTRODUCTION
2. THE NATURALNESS ROLE
3. HOW MUCH OF THE ROLE IS SATISFIED?
3.1. Supervenience + Magnetism
3.2. Supervenience + Magnetism + (Non-duplication or Independence)
3.3. Independence + ((Duplication and Non-duplication) or Supervenience)
3.4. Duplication + (Independence or Dissimilarity or Laws or Magnetism)
3.5. Empiricism + Independence
3.6. (Empiricism or Duplication) + (Dissimilarity or Magnetism)
3.7. Similarity + (Simplicity or Dissimilarity or Magnetism)
3.8. (Similarity or Dissimilarity or Magnetism) + (Independence orEmpiricism) + Simplicity
3.9. Simplicity + (Dissimilarity or Magnetism)
3.10. (Similarity or Dissimilarity) + Magnetism
4. HOW VAGUE IS ‘NATURAL’?
5. ‘IS NATURALNESS PRIMITIVE?’
6. HAVE WE MISSED THE HEART OF THE MATTER?
REFERENCES
2. Fundamental Properties of Fundamental Properties
1. INTRODUCTION
2. BACKGROUND
3. QUANTITIES
4. THEORIES OF QUANTITY
4.1. Numerical relations
4.2. Intrinsic structure of quantitative properties
4.3. First-order relations: Betweenness and congruence
4.4. Second-order relations: Less than or equal to and sum of
5. PERFECTLY NATURAL SECOND-ORDER RELATIONS
5.1. Resemblance
5.2. Laws
5.3. Counterfactuals
5.4. Causation
6. MINIMALITY
REFERENCES
3. Absolutism vs Comparativism about Quantity
1. MORE ON ABSOLUTISM AND COMPARATIVISM
2. OBJECTIONS FROM INTUITION
3. OBJECTIONS FROM MODALITY
4. THE OBJECTION FROM SEMANTICS
5. THE OBJECTION FROM KILOGRAMS
6. THE OBJECTION FROM HUMEANISM
7. OBJECTIONS FROM PHYSICS
8. IN FAVOR OF COMPARATIVISM
8.1. The Occamist argument
8.2. The case of velocity
8.3. Undetectable by us
8.4. A second argument
8.5. Indiscernibility
8.6. Inexpressible ignorance
9. CONCLUSION
REFERENCES
ONTOLOGICAL COMMITMENTS: WORDS AND SLOTS
4. Modal Quantification without Worlds
1. PRELIMINARIES: REDUCTIVE ANALYSES OF MODALITY AND QUANTIFICATION
2. PRIMITIVE SECOND-ORDER QUANTIFICATION
2.1. Second-order home languages
2.2. Ontological commitment
2.3. Expressive needs
3. COMPLICATIONS: TRUTH-AT-A-WORLD
4. HYPERINTENSIONAL CONNECTIVES
5. A SECOND-ORDER ANALYSIS OF AND
6. REFORMULATING GLOBAL SUPERVENIENCE
7. CONCLUSION: THE PLACE OF WORLDS IN A HYPERINTENSIONAL SETTING
REFERENCES
5. Slots in Universals
1. INTRODUCTION
2. EXPLICIT QUANTIFICATION OVER SLOTS
3. ACCOUNTS OF ADICY
3.1. First slot-free account: Fundamental one-place adicy predicates
3.2. Second slot-free account: A primitive two-place “specifies-the adicy-of” predicate
3.2.1. First problem: Brute facts
3.2.2. Second problem: Ungrounded numeric adicy facts
3.3. Third slot-free account: Define “specifies the adicy of” in terms of a non-distributive instantiation predicate
3.4. Fourth slot-free account: Define “n is the adicy of u” as “u is instantiated only by n-tuples”
3.5. Fifth slot-free account: Define “n specifies the adicy of u” as “u can be instantiated only by n-tuples”
3.6. Sixth slot-free account: Adicies of uninstantiable universals explained by appeal to facts about the universals in terms of which they are analyzed
3.7. Seventh slot-free account: Counterfactual definitions of “specifies the adicy of”
3.8. Eighth account: Defining “specifies the adicy of” in terms of essence
3.9. Ninth account: Define “specifies the adicy of” in terms of canonical names
3.10. Tenth account: Saturation
3.10.1. Inward-looking relations
3.10.2. Applying the test to being saturated by a 2-tuple and only by 2-tuples
3.10.3. Applying the test to having exactly 2 slots
4. A PROBLEM FOR SLOTS?
5. CONCLUSION
REFERENCES
MEREOLOGY
6. Against Parthood
1. THE ARGUMENT FROM IDEOLOGICAL PARSIMONY
2. MOOREANISM
3. ORDINARY AND FUNDAMENTAL LANGUAGES
4. MOOREANISM AGAIN
5. THE PERCEPTUAL ARGUMENT
6. WILLIAMSON
7. THE CARTESIAN ARGUMENT
8. THE DEFLATIONARY ARGUMENT
9. GUNK
10. POSSIBLE GUNK
11. COMPOSITES NEEDED IN PHYSICS
REFERENCES
7. Composition as General Identity
1. SYNTAX, SEMANTICS, AND IDENTITY
1.1. Singular, plural, many, one
1.2. Singularization in natural language
2. MANY-ONE IDENTITY
3. LEIBNIZ’S LAW
3.1. Plural predication
3.2. Covers and counts
4. SIDER’S OBJECTIONS
4.1. Collapse
4.2. Plural predication again
APPENDIX 1: THE LANGUAGE Lci
APPENDIX 2: MEREOLOGY FOR
REFERENCES
8. Cut the Pie Any Way You Like? Cotnoir on General Identity
1. INTRODUCTION
2. WHY ANTIPODEAN COUNTERPARTS ARE NOT EVEN SLIGHTLY IDENTICAL
3. PORTIONS OF REALITY DISTINGUISHED FROM OBJECTS?
4. PORTIONS OF REALITY ARE OBJECTS
REFERENCES
THE A-THEORY OF TIME
9. Living on the Brink, or Welcome Back, Growing Block!
I
II
III
IV
REFERENCES
10. Fighting the Zombie of the Growing Salami
1. SOME PRELIMINARY CLARIFICATIONS
2. THE FIRST STAKE
3. A SECOND STAB
4. CONCLUSION
REFERENCES
11. Changing Truthmakers: Reply to Tallant and Ingram
1. THE THEORY AND THE PROBLEM
2. WHOSE PROBLEM IS IT ANYWAY?
3. THE SOLUTION
4. THE SOLUTION MADE MORE PALATABLE: ILLUSIONS OF POSSIBILITY AND ILLUSIONS OF CHANGE
REFERENCES
AUTHOR INDEX