Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Volume 10

✍ Scribed by Karen Bennett (editor), Dean W. Zimmerman (editor)

• Publisher: Oxford University Press
• Year: 2017
• Tongue: English
• Leaves: 330
• Category: Library

✦ Synopsis

Much of the most interesting work in philosophy today is metaphysical in character. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics is a forum for the best new work in this flourishing field. OSM offers a broad view of the subject, featuring not only the traditionally central topics such as existence, identity, modality, time, and causation, but also the rich clusters of metaphysical questions in neighbouring fields, such as philsophy of mind and philosophy of science. Besides independent essays, volumes will often contain a critical essay on a recent book, or a symposium that allows participants to respond to one another's criticisms and questions. Anyone who wants to know what's happening in metaphysics can start here.

✦ Table of Contents

Cover
Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Volume 10
Copyright
Preface
Contents
The Sanders Prize in Metaphysics
Dispositions
1: Teleological Dispositions
1. Introduction
2. Conditional Analyses
2.1 The simple conditional analysis
2.2 Appealing to the exclusion of external interference
2.3 Appealing to normal conditions
2.4 Appealing to proportionality
2.5 A different direction
3. A Teleological Account of Dispositions
3.1 Preliminary remarks
3.2 The first step
3.3 The proposal
4. A Detour
4.1 Seriously?
4.2 The progressive aspect and events in progress
4.3 Against the competition
4.4 Taking stock
5. Concluding Remarks
Acknowledgments
APPENDIX
References
2: Indirect Directness
3: Dispositions without Teleology
1. Directedness and Dispositions
2. Directedness, Dispositions, and Conditionals
3. Directedness and Progressives
References
Analyticity Revisited
4: Devious Stipulations
1. Introduction
2. Verdantly*´ 3.Grassgreen´
4. `Priman Beings´
5. Conclusion
References
5: Stipulations and Requirements: Reply to Horden
References
What Reality is Like
6: Colors as Primitive Dispositions
1. Motivations and Puzzles
1.1 The motivation for dispositionalism
1.2 The motivation for primitivism
1.3 The tension
2. Appearance Properties as Dispositions to Appear F
2.1 Appearance properties
2.2 Appearance properties are dispositions to appear F
3. What Colors are: Applying the Model
3.1 Applying the model
3.2 Metaphysical implications: between dispositionalism and primitivism
4. Do Colors Look Non-Dispositional?
4.1 Monadic (i.e. non-relational) properties
4.2 Constant properties
4.3 Categorical properties
5. Do Colors Look Like Dispositions?
5.1 Seeing colors as appearance properties
5.2 Revelation?
References
7: Are There Ineffable Aspects of Reality?
1. Introduction
2. What is the question?
3. In Support of the Ineffable
3.1 Built-in cognitive limitations
3.2 The argument from analogy
3.3 Cardinality arguments
3.4 Explaining effability
3.5 The sources of ineffability
4. The Sub-Algebra Hypothesis and its Consequences
4.1 The hiddenness of the ineffable
4.2 The sub-algebra hypothesis
4.3 Ineffability and modesty
5. Internalism, Effability, and Idealism
5.1 Talk about propositions: that-clauses
5.2 Talk about propositions: quantifiers
5.3 Internalism vs. externalism
5.4 Internalism and the effability thesis
5.5 The proper formulation of internalism
5.6 Explaining apparent ineffability
5.7 The internalist picture of the propositional
5.8 Idealism vindicated
6. Conclusion
References
8: The Metaphysics of Quantities and Their Dimensions
1. Introduction
2. Quantities, Scales, and Dimension Formulas
3. The Positivist Theory of Dimensions, and its Opponents
4. Building some quantities from others?
5. Defending a Definitional Connection
6. Definitional Connection Without Right Units
7. Conclusion
APPENDIX: A BIT MORE ON CONSTRUCTION
References
Modality and Existence
9: Vague Existence
1. Against ``against vague existence´´
1.1 Sider against vague existence
1.2 Super-vague existence
1.3 Metalanguage objection
2. Super-Vague Existence and its Logic
2.1 Finean supervaluationism
2.2 Variable domain frames
2.3 Negative supervaluationary semantics
2.4 Objection from reductio ad absurdum
2.5 Inferentialist objection
3. Conclusion
Acknowledgments
APPENDICES
Appendix A: Finean supervaluationism and existence
Appendix B: Elements of negative supervaluationary semantics
B.1 NS and existential generalization
B.2 NS and negative free logic I
B.3 NS and the indiscernibility of non-existents
B.4 NS and negative free logic II
B.5 NS and identity
B.6 NS and the importation schema (IM)
B.7 NS and super-vague existence
REFERENCES
10: Ersatz Counterparts
1. Ersatz Counterparts
2. Ersatz Counterpart Relations
3. The Principle of Solitude
4. Semantics Versus Metaphysics
Conclusion
Acknowledgements
References
Grounding and Explanation
11: The Principle of Sufficient Reason and Probability
1. The Principle of Sufficient Reason
2. Local Chances
2.1 Frequency to chance inferences
2.2 Nonmeasurable sets
2.3 No-explanation hypotheses
3. Globalizing
3.1 Small worlds
3.2 Global probabilities
4. Psr-Compatible Aberrant Hypotheses
5. Conclusions
APPENDIX: SOME RESULTS ABOUT NONMEASURABLE SETS
References
12: Grounding Ground
1. Introduction
1.1 Overview of the paper
2. Ground and Explanation
3. A Status Problem
4. The Zero-Grounding Account
5. Ground, Machines, and Graphs
6. Ground and Explanatory Arguments
6.1 Is non-factive ground non-circular?
6.2 Impossible explanations
7. Grounding Operators: Introduction Rules
8. Grounding Operators: Elimination Rules
9. Every (True) Non-Factive Grounding Claim has the Same Ground
10. Comparison with the Straightforward Account
11. Concluding Remarks
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
APPENDIX A PLISFG AND PLSFG
APPENDIX B GRAPHICAL SEMANTICS
References
Author Index