Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Volume 13

✍ Scribed by Karen Bennett (editor), Dean W. Zimmerman (editor)

• Publisher: Oxford University Press
• Year: 2023
• Tongue: English
• Leaves: 327
• Category: Library

✦ Synopsis

Much of the most interesting work in philosophy today is metaphysical in character. Oxford Studies in Metaphysics is a forum for the best new work in this flourishing field. OSM offers a broad view of the subject, featuring not only the traditionally central topics such as existence, identity, modality, time, and causation, but also the rich clusters of metaphysical questions in neighbouring fields, such as philsophy of mind and philosophy of science. Besides independent essays, volumes will often contain a critical essay on a recent book, or a symposium that allows participants to respond to one another's criticisms and questions. Anyone who wants to know what's happening in metaphysics can start here.

✦ Table of Contents

Cover
Oxford Studies in Metaphysics: Volume 13
Copyright
Preface
Contents
The Sanders Prize in Metaphysics
PART I: PARTS AND PLURALITIES
1: Paraphrase Techniques for Nihilists
1. 1
1. 2
1. 3
1. 4
References
2: Composite Objects are Mere Manys
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Objects, individuals, and a quasi-Quinean metaontology
2.2.1 The alleged singularity of objects
2.2.2 Quantifiers and Quine
2.3 Why we should be manyists
2.3.1 Manyism as an improvement on CAI
2.3.2 Objection 1: Manyism is really no different from CAI
2.3.3 Objection 2: We need composite objects to be one in number
2.3.3.1 Superplural semantics
2.3.3.2 The gunk objection
2.3.3.3 A collapse to nihilism?
2.4 Conclusion
Acknowledgements
References
3: A Special Composition Puzzle
3.1 Introduction
3.2 The Puzzle
3.3 Instances of the Puzzle
3.4 A Spatial Approach to Mereology and General Composition
3.5 Conclusion
Bibliography
PART II: CAUSATION, COUNTERFACTUALS, AND ESSENCES
4: The Varieties of Relevance
4.1 The great misclassification
4.2 More on direct vs indirect relevance
4.3 Background conditions as indirect mode
4.4 Event/state and activity/stative
4.5 Ennoblers
4.6 Enablers
4.7 Depicting indirect relevance
4.8 Enabling, causing, and locality
4.9 Indirect relevance and structural equations
4.10 Direct vs indirect relevance in scientific contexts
4.11 Counterfactual dependence
4.12 Two kinds of causation?; and, who cares?
4.13 Basic vs derived varieties
4.14 Transitivity
4.15 Prevention
4.16 Against causing a negative: the analogy to undercutting defeat
4.17 Against causing a negative: there are no negative acts
4.18 Against causing a negative: there are no negative events
4.19 Preventing is indirectly relevant
4.20 Double prevention
4.21 Enabling vs double prevention
4.22 Conclusion
References
5: Counterpart Theory and Counterfactuals
5.1 Principles of counterfactual logic
5.2 Counterpart theory and Counterfactuals
5.3 Two dead ends
5.3.1 Quasinecessitism?
5.3.2 Who cares?
5.4 A new translation
5.5 Modal logic within counterfactual logic
5.6 Basic modal logic lost and restored
5.7 Identity and existence
5.8 A semantic anomaly
5.9 The Kaplan translation
5.10 Concluding remarks
References
6: Essence and Thisness
6.1 Introduction
6.2 The definitional model
6.3 A clarification on the problem with the definitional model¹⁵
6.4 In defense of (P1)
6.5 In defense of (P2)
6.5.1 Is there an essential truth about Socrates other than (E2) that grounds (N2)?
6.5.2 Is there an essential truth about plural objects that grounds (N2)?
6.5.3 Is there an essential truth about an object other than Socrates that grounds (N2)?
6.5.4 Is there an essential truth about a property that grounds (N2)?
6.6 Toward an alternative model of essence
References
PART III: TIME, CHANGE, AND PERSISTENCE
7: Prudence and Perdurance
7.1 Introduction
7.2 The normative argument against perdurantism
7.3 Prudence and Humeanism
7.4 The analytic approach
7.5 Against the Adjacent-Stage Possibility Claim
7.6 The Non-Adjacent-Stage Possibility Claim
7.7 Overall wellbeing
7.8 Conclusion
References
8: The Situationalist Account of Change
8.1 Change
8.2 Situations
8.3 Change in terms of situations
8.4 Worries
(a) Monotonicity
(b) Indeterminacy/reality in pieces
8.5 Comparisons
(a) Fragmentalisms
(b) Bottani’s indeterminacy
(c) Moore’s disunified world(s)
8.6 Conclusion
References
9: The Logic of Past-Alteration
9.1 Introduction
9.2 Clarifying the target
9.3 Past-alteration in tense logic
9.4 Future-alteration in tense logic
9.5 Interpreting the models
9.6 Hypertemporal accounts
9.7 Past-alteration and explanatory gaps
9.8 Conclusion
Acknowledgements
References
Index