We present some algorithmic unsolvability and incompleteness results in game theory and discuss their significance. The main theorem presents a class of n-person games, where each player's strategy set is the real line and payoffs are continuous functions, for which there could not possibly exist a
On the geometry of Nash equilibria and correlated equilibria
β Scribed by Robert Nau; Sabrina Gomez Canovas; Pierre Hansen
- Publisher
- Springer-Verlag
- Year
- 2004
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 368 KB
- Volume
- 32
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0020-7276
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