✦ LIBER ✦

On eliciting beliefs in strategic games

✍ Scribed by Thomas R. Palfrey; Stephanie W. Wang

Book ID: 116635596
Publisher: Elsevier Science
Year: 2009
Tongue: English
Weight: 318 KB
Volume: 71
Category: Article
ISSN: 0167-2681
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2009.03.025

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

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