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Beliefs in Repeated Games

✍ Scribed by John H. Nachbar

Book ID: 111755526
Publisher: John Wiley and Sons
Year: 2005
Tongue: English
Weight: 174 KB
Volume: 73
Category: Article
ISSN: 0012-9682
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0262.2005.00585.x

No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.

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