Rational beliefs in extensive games

✍ Scribed by Giacomo Bonanno

• Publisher: Springer US
• Year: 1992
• Tongue: English
• Weight: 928 KB
• Volume: 33
• Category: Article
• ISSN: 0040-5833
• DOI: 10.1007/bf00134094

✦ Synopsis

Given an extensive game, with every node x and every player i a subset Ki(x ) of the set of terminal nodes is associated, and is given the interpretation of player i's knowledge (or information) at node x. A belief of player i is a function that associates with every node x an element of the set K~(x). A belief system is an n-tuple of beliefs, one for each player. A belief system is rational if it satisfies some natural consistency properties. The main result of the paper is that the notion of rational belief system gives rise to a refinement of the notion of subgame-perfect equilibrium.