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Rational beliefs in extensive games

✍ Scribed by Giacomo Bonanno


Publisher
Springer US
Year
1992
Tongue
English
Weight
928 KB
Volume
33
Category
Article
ISSN
0040-5833

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✦ Synopsis


Given an extensive game, with every node x and every player i a subset Ki(x ) of the set of terminal nodes is associated, and is given the interpretation of player i's knowledge (or information) at node x. A belief of player i is a function that associates with every node x an element of the set K~(x). A belief system is an n-tuple of beliefs, one for each player. A belief system is rational if it satisfies some natural consistency properties. The main result of the paper is that the notion of rational belief system gives rise to a refinement of the notion of subgame-perfect equilibrium.


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