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Strategic irrationality in extensive games

✍ Scribed by Kaushik Basu

Publisher: Elsevier Science
Year: 1988
Tongue: English
Weight: 860 KB
Volume: 15
Category: Article
ISSN: 0165-4896
DOI: 10.1016/0165-4896(88)90010-8

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