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Nash equilibria of finitely repeated games

✍ Scribed by J. -P. Benoit; V. Krishna


Publisher
Springer-Verlag
Year
1987
Tongue
English
Weight
382 KB
Volume
16
Category
Article
ISSN
0020-7276

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## Abstract We define a new concept of constrained strategic equilibrium (CSE) for Bayesian games. We show that a sequence of CSEs approximates an equilibrium under standard conditions. We also provide an algorithm to implement the CSE approximation method numerically in a broad class of Bayesian g