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Nash equilibria in risk-sensitive dynamic games

✍ Scribed by Klompstra, M.B.

Book ID: 118150057
Publisher: IEEE
Year: 2000
Tongue: English
Weight: 227 KB
Volume: 45
Category: Article
ISSN: 0018-9286
DOI: 10.1109/9.867067

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## Abstract We define a new concept of constrained strategic equilibrium (CSE) for Bayesian games. We show that a sequence of CSEs approximates an equilibrium under standard conditions. We also provide an algorithm to implement the CSE approximation method numerically in a broad class of Bayesian g