Market Operation for Reactive Power Ancillary Service: Design and Analysis with GAMS Code (Springer Tracts in Electrical and Electronics Engineering)

✍ Scribed by Devika Jay, K. Shanti Swarup

• Publisher: Springer
• Year: 2024
• Tongue: English
• Leaves: 136
• Category: Library

✦ Synopsis

This book provides a framework suitable for the design and analysis of market mechanisms suitable for reactive power ancillary service. The book focuses on the formulation of market mechanisms capable of handling the localized nature of reactive power. The book presents tools and methodologies to design a suitable market structure capable of handling the technical challenges associated with the reactive power market like localized nature or reactive power, voltage support requirement, reactive power reserve requirement, and coupling between active reactive power markets. The book also presents techniques suitable for analyzing the market efficiency of different market mechanisms for reactive power ancillary service. The key topics discussed in this book include the relevance and challenges of reactive power ancillary service; the design of market mechanisms; network partitioning techniques to handle the localized nature of reactive power; and analysis of market mechanisms for market efficiency. This book is helpful for researchers and graduate students to know about recent advances in this area. Practitioners find the book helpful for understanding how technological advances can be put into practice and learning from case studies that bring out practical challenges.

✦ Table of Contents

Preface
Contents
About the Authors
Part I Deregulation in Power System
1 Introduction to Electricity Markets
1.1 Deregulation in Power Systems
1.1.1 Entities in Restructured Power Systems
1.1.2 Challenges in Deregulation
1.2 Electricity Markets Under Deregulation
1.2.1 Modes of Market Operation
1.2.2 Models for Market Operation
1.2.3 Types of Electricity Markets
1.3 Concepts of Smart Grid
1.4 Wholesale Electricity Markets
1.5 Retail Electricity Markets
1.6 Coordination of Wholesale and Retail Markets
1.6.1 DSO Leader
1.6.2 DSO Follower
1.6.3 TSO-DSO Iteration
1.7 Basics of Market Economics
1.7.1 Producer Model
1.7.2 Consumer Model
1.7.3 Market Equilibrium
1.8 Summary and Takeaways
2 Energy and Ancillary Service Markets
2.1 Energy Markets
2.1.1 LMP Calculation in IEEE 9-Bus System
2.2 Ancillary Services
2.2.1 Frequency Control Ancillary Service
2.2.2 Network Support and Control Ancillary Service
2.2.3 System Restart Ancillary Service
2.3 Ancillary Service Markets
2.4 Challenges in Ancillary Service Markets
2.5 Summary and Takeaways
3 Reactive Power Ancillary Service Markets
3.1 Reactive Power Ancillary Service
3.2 Basic Concept of Reactive Power Markets
3.3 Existing Reactive Power Ancillary Service Markets
3.4 Challenges in Reactive Power Market
3.5 Ideal Reactive Power Market
References
Part II Design of Reactive Power Markets
4 Reactive Power and Network Partitioning
4.1 Relevance of Network Partitioning Techniques
4.2 Voltage Control Areas
4.2.1 Hierarchical Classification Algorithm
4.2.2 Spectral Clustering
4.3 Relative Electrical Distance
4.4 Voltage-Apparent Power Coupling Factor
4.4.1 Defining Graph from Relative Electrical Distance
4.4.2 Illustration of Graph Formation from Relative Electrical Distance Measure
4.5 Voltage-Apparent Power Coupled Areas
4.5.1 Laplacian of a Graph and Isoperimetric Clustering
4.5.2 Algorithm of Isoperimetric Clustering-Based Network Partitioning
4.6 Summary and Takeaways
References
5 Value-Based Reactive Power Market in Local Market Areas
5.1 Introduction
5.2 Value Function for Reactive Power
5.3 Mathematical Formulation of VBRPM
5.4 Case Studies
5.4.1 Case 1: Base Case
5.4.2 Case 2: Line Outage Cases
5.4.3 Case 3: Strategical Bidding of GENCOs
5.5 Summary and Takeaways
References
Part III Analysis of Reactive Power Markets
6 Game Theoretical Analysis
6.1 Basics of Game Theory
6.1.1 Cournot Model
6.1.2 Bertrand Model
6.1.3 Stackelberg Model
6.2 Game Theoretical Analysis of Market Models
6.3 Existence of Equilibrium
6.4 Incentive Compatibility and Individual Rationality
6.5 Illustrative Examples
6.6 Summary and Takeaways
References
7 Deep Learning Analysis
7.1 Basics of Deep Learning
7.2 Classical Q-Learning
7.3 Long Short-Term Memory Network
7.4 Deep Learning-Based Analysis of Bidding Strategies
7.4.1 Challenges in Learning Optimal Bidding Strategies
7.4.2 Reactive Power Market Environment for Learning
7.4.3 Handling Higher Order Markov Decision Process
7.4.4 Handling Imperfect Information in the Market
7.4.5 Features of Reinforcement Learning-Based Agent
7.4.6 Neural Fitted Q-Iteration
7.4.7 NFQ-TP-Based Learning Algorithm
7.5 Summary and Takeaways
References
8 Reactive Power Ancillary Service in Indian Grid Operation
8.1 Ancillary Services in India
8.1.1 Reactive Power Pricing in India
8.2 Drawbacks in Existing Reactive Power Pricing
8.3 Feasibility and Benefits of Value-Based Reactive Power Market
8.4 Summary and Takeaways
Appendix A GAMS Code
A.1 DC-OPF for IEEE 9-Bus System
A.2 AC-OPF for PJM 5-Bus System
A.3 Multi-period Value-Based Reactive Power Market for IEEE 24-Bus System
A.4 Single-Leader Follower Game Model in PJM 5-Bus
Appendix B Reactive Power for Voltage Support