Limits to redistribution in a democracy: a survey
โ Scribed by Philipp Harms; Stefan Zink
- Book ID
- 114179291
- Publisher
- Elsevier Science
- Year
- 2003
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 173 KB
- Volume
- 19
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0176-2680
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
๐ SIMILAR VOLUMES
In order to maximize votes, incumbent politicians design and implement redistributional programs. These programs benefit some voters at the expense of others. In the simple two group (or tax payers and beneficiaries) case we identify the nature of vote maximizing transfer policies. This model's basi
In a recent article in Public Choice, E. C. Pasour~ Jr. (1981) attacks with considerable zeal the usefulness of the so-called Pareto optimal redistribution literature. He finds little of value in this approach either as a normative guide for judging redistribution programs or as a positive tool for