Redistributive politics: A theory of taxation for an incumbent in a democracy

✍ Scribed by Norman Frohlich; Joe Oppenheimer

• Publisher: Springer US
• Year: 1990
• Tongue: English
• Weight: 975 KB
• Volume: 64
• Category: Article
• ISSN: 0048-5829
• DOI: 10.1007/bf00153160

✦ Synopsis

In order to maximize votes, incumbent politicians design and implement redistributional programs. These programs benefit some voters at the expense of others. In the simple two group (or tax payers and beneficiaries) case we identify the nature of vote maximizing transfer policies. This model's basic approach is shown to hold for multiple group models as well. Strategic implications for the organizers of sub groups of the population (or group leaders) are developed. Other extensions of the model are discussed.

Where the budget is clever is in its detail. Each little measure is designed to hurt (but not too much) people who are not politically important, while tossing a bone to people who are. You can see this in a host of different ways. l