In a recent article in Public Choice, E. C. Pasour~ Jr. (1981) attacks with considerable zeal the usefulness of the so-called Pareto optimal redistribution literature. He finds little of value in this approach either as a normative guide for judging redistribution programs or as a positive tool for explaining existing redistributional activity. While several of his criticisms are valid, Pasour's wholesale dismissal of the usefulness of the approach overlooks much of the more recent literature in the area and is based upon a narrow, mechanistic interpretation of this line of analysis.
Pasour's major theme is the failure of real-world redistribution to fit into the model established by the Pareto optimal redistribution or utility interdependency literature. It should be noted that the articles cited for his criticism (Hochman and Rodger;1969;Zeckhauser, 1971;Thurow, 1971) are now a decade or more old. These were seminal articles in this area which may have quite understandably overstated the power of this approach. He has not dealt with some of the more recent literature, especially that which has focused more narrowly on the analysis of particular programs and policies such as, for example, the tax treatment of charitable contributions (Hochman and Rogers, 1977), aid to dependent children (Orr, 1976), the food stamp program (Giertz andSullivan, 1977 and 1978), and wage supplements and negative income taxation (Holahan and Perlman, 1978).