In this paper we reconsider the basic model of "efficient rent seeking." We stress the importance of the shape of the players' reaction curve in order to understand the impact of the technology of rent-seeking on the structure of the outcome of the game. We give a complete characterization of the pu
β¦ LIBER β¦
Learning the structure of a simple rent-seeking game
β Scribed by Derek J. Clark
- Book ID
- 110217657
- Publisher
- Springer US
- Year
- 1997
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 80 KB
- Volume
- 93
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0048-5829
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
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