Dynamic rent-seeking games with nonlinear cost functions are analyzed. The local asymptotic stability of the solution is first examined. We show that in the absence of a dominant agent, all eigenvalues of the Jacobian are real. Conditions are given for the local asymptotic stability as well as for t
✦ LIBER ✦
A general analysis of rent-seeking games
✍ Scribed by J. David Pérez-Castrillo; Thierry Verdier
- Publisher
- Springer US
- Year
- 1992
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 646 KB
- Volume
- 73
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0048-5829
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✦ Synopsis
In this paper we reconsider the basic model of "efficient rent seeking." We stress the importance of the shape of the players' reaction curve in order to understand the impact of the technology of rent-seeking on the structure of the outcome of the game. We give a complete characterization of the pure strategy equilibria. Moreover, the possibility of preemption by a Stakelberg leader is discussed according to the nature of the technology of rent-seeking available to the agents. * We would like to thank an anonymous referee for his useful comments
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