In this paper we reconsider the basic model of "efficient rent seeking." We stress the importance of the shape of the players' reaction curve in order to understand the impact of the technology of rent-seeking on the structure of the outcome of the game. We give a complete characterization of the pu
The asymptotic behavior of dynamic rent-seeking games
β Scribed by C. Chiarella; F. Szidarovszky
- Publisher
- Elsevier Science
- Year
- 2002
- Tongue
- English
- Weight
- 491 KB
- Volume
- 43
- Category
- Article
- ISSN
- 0898-1221
No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
β¦ Synopsis
Dynamic rent-seeking games with nonlinear cost functions are analyzed. The local asymptotic stability of the solution is first examined. We show that in the absence of a dominant agent, all eigenvalues of the Jacobian are real. Conditions are given for the local asymptotic stability as well as for the local instability of the equilibrium. In the presence of a dominant agent, complex eigenvalues are possible. Simple stability conditions ave presented for cases when all eigenvalues are real, and the possibility of limit cycles is analyzed in the case of complex eigenvalues. (~) 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
π SIMILAR VOLUMES