Language, Games, and Evolution: Trends in Current Research on Language and Game Theory

✍ Scribed by Anton Benz, Christian Ebert, Gerhard Jäger, Robert van Rooij

• Publisher: Springer
• Year: 2011
• Tongue: English
• Leaves: 197
• Series: Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence 6207
• Edition: 1st Edition.
• Category: Library

✦ Synopsis

Recent years witnessed an increased interest in formal pragmatics and especially the establishment of game theory as a new research methodology for the study of language use. Game and Decision Theory (GDT) are natural candidates if we look for a theoretical foundation of linguistic pragmatics. Over the last decade, a firm research community has emerged with a strong interdisciplinary character, where economists, philosophers, and social scientists meet with linguists. Within this field of research, three major currents can be distinguished: one is closely related to the Gricean paradigm and aims at a precise foundation of pragmatic reasoning, the second originates in the economic literature and is concerned with the role of game theory in the context of language use, and the third aims at language evolution seen either from a biological or from a cultural perspective. Edited in collaboration with FoLLI, the Association of Logic, Language and Information, this volume is based on a selection of papers of two international conferences, one organised at ESSLLI in 2007 on language, games, and evolution, and the other organised at the ZAS in Berlin on games and decisions in pragmatics in 2008. This volume is rounded off by additional invited papers and now contains eight articles of leading researchers in the field which together provide a state-of-the-art survey of current research on language evolution and game theoretic approaches to pragmatics.

✦ Table of Contents

Cover......Page 1
Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence 6207......Page 2
Texts in Logic and Games......Page 3
Language, Games,
and Evolution......Page 4
ISBN-13 9783642180057......Page 5
Foreword......Page 6
Table of Contents......Page 7
Introduction......Page 9
Overview......Page 17
References......Page 20
Introduction......Page 22
The Optimal-Answer Model......Page 23
Optimal Answers......Page 24
Implicatures of Optimal Answers......Page 27
Examples......Page 30
Multiple Attributes and Utilities......Page 31
The Analysis of an Example......Page 35
The Construction of Normal Models......Page 37
Violations of the Normality Assumptions......Page 41
A Classification of Support Problems and Implicatures of Simple Answers......Page 42
Conclusion......Page 46
References......Page 47
Vagueness and Games of Conflict......Page 48
Strategic Generality......Page 50
Strategic Vagueness and Strategic Ambiguity......Page 51
Absolute Adjectives and Adverbs......Page 56
Semi-orders and Bounded Rationality......Page 58
A Behavioural Approach to Vagueness: Prospect Theory......Page 63
References......Page 66
Now That You Mention It Awareness Dynamics in Discourse and Decisions......Page 68
Unawareness in Conversation......Page 69
Three Slogans about Unawareness......Page 70
Pragmatic Reasoning about Unawareness......Page 71
Formalising Unawareness......Page 72
The Propositional Case......Page 73
Summary of the Model......Page 74
Decision Problems and Awareness Dynamics......Page 75
Awareness Dynamics, Decisions, and Pragmatics......Page 84
Decision-Theoretic Relevance......Page 85
In Defense of VEC......Page 86
Reasoning about Relevance of Awareness......Page 87
The Propositional Case......Page 88
Updates for Decision Problems......Page 89
Old Information in the Light of New Awareness......Page 90
Formal Awareness Models......Page 91
Assumptions and Associations......Page 93
Unawareness in Linguistics......Page 95
References......Page 97
Focus Projection and the Grammar......Page 100
The Role of Speaker Choice......Page 102
Contextual Factors in Accent Placement......Page 104
Formal Model......Page 108
Results......Page 111
Costs and Cost Differentials......Page 112
Discussion......Page 115
Conclusions and Future Work......Page 116
Novel Aspects of the Model......Page 117
Extending the Analysis......Page 118
Testing the Model......Page 121
References......Page 122
Evolutionarily Stable Communication and Pragmatics......Page 125
The Problems of Evolutionarily Stable Communication......Page 126
Solutions to the Problems of Evolutionarily Stable Communication......Page 130
Stable Communication in Humans......Page 134
Concluding Remarks......Page 137
References......Page 138
Introduction......Page 142
Cooperation in Spatialized Game Theory......Page 143
Studies in Communication......Page 145
The Dynamics of Feeding, Predation, and Simple Signaling......Page 147
Emergence of Communication in Spatialized Arrays of Neural Nets......Page 148
The Emergence of Pragmatics......Page 152
Quantity......Page 154
Quality......Page 155
Relevance......Page 157
Co-emergence of the Maxims......Page 159
Simulating Grice......Page 161
Pragmatic Implicature and Inference......Page 162
Conclusion......Page 165
References......Page 166
Introduction......Page 168
Lewis Signaling Games......Page 169
Evolutionary Dynamics of Signaling Games......Page 171
Replicator Dynamics......Page 172
Selection-Mutation Dynamics......Page 174
Structurally Stable Signaling Games......Page 175
Learning Models......Page 176
Indefinite Memory......Page 178
Similar Reinforcement Models......Page 180
Conclusions......Page 181
References......Page 182
Logic......Page 185
Conversation......Page 186
Logic and Conversation......Page 188
Inventing the Categories and the Code......Page 189
Extracting Relevant Information......Page 190
Taking a Vote......Page 191
Beyond Common Interest......Page 192
Deception......Page 193
References......Page 194
Author Index......Page 197