<p><span>This book examines phenomenal conservatism, one of the most influential and promising internalist conceptions of non-inferential justification debated in current epistemology and philosophy of mind. It also explores the significance of the findings of this examination for the general debate
Justified Belief and Epistemically Responsible Action
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No coin nor oath required. For personal study only.
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<span>This book considers whether we can be epistemically responsible for undesirable beliefs, such as racist and sexist ones. The problem with holding people responsible for their undesirable beliefs is: first, what constitutes an βundesirable beliefβ will differ among various epistemic communities
Epistemic norms play an increasingly important role in many current debates in epistemology and beyond. Paramount among these are debates about belief, action, and assertion. Three primary questions organize the literature. What epistemic requirements constrain appropriate belief? What epistemic req
This volume gathers eleven new and three previously unpublished essays that take on questions of epistemic justification, responsibility, and virtue. It contains the best recent work in this area by major figures such as Ernest Sosa, Robert Audi, Alvin Goldman, and Susan Haak.
<i>Develops a new kind of epistemological position that highlights virtue over more standard epistemological theories.</i> Having adequate knowledge of the world is not just a matter of survival but also one of obligation. This obligation to βknow wellβ is what philosophers have termed βepistemic