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Inefficiency of Strategy-Proof Rules for Pure Exchange Economies

✍ Scribed by Shigehiro Serizawa

Book ID: 112258344
Publisher: Elsevier Science
Year: 2002
Tongue: English
Weight: 193 KB
Volume: 106
Category: Article
ISSN: 0022-0531
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2002.2940

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