A word of thanks......Page 11
1. ‘How comes the mind to be furnished?’......Page 13
2. Survey of recent literature......Page 17
3. Structure and contents of this study......Page 21
1. What is a concept?......Page 25
2. The relevance of concepts in ancient epistemological debates......Page 36
3. Different models of concept acquisition in antiquity......Page 41
4. Forms and concepts & problematic concepts......Page 47
1.1. The role of concepts in Plato......Page 51
1.2. Forms, concepts, language......Page 53
2.1. Concepts as ‘one over many’......Page 57
2.2. Refuting conceptualism?......Page 60
2.3. Conclusion......Page 63
3.1. The transition from opinion (doxa) to knowledge......Page 64
3.2. Conclusion......Page 68
4.1. The deficiency argument (Phaedo 72e–77a)......Page 69
4.2. The continuity between Meno and Phaedo......Page 76
5.1. Recollection and concept attainment (Phaedrus 249b–c)......Page 77
5.2. Forms, concepts, language again......Page 82
6.1. Recollection in Plato’s later works......Page 83
6.2. Innateness and the structure of the human soul......Page 85
7.1. Some problematic concepts......Page 90
7.2. Recollection and error......Page 95
8. Forms, concepts, and recollection......Page 96
1.1. A strange couple......Page 99
1.2. Aristotle’s arguments against innate knowledge......Page 100
2.1. Concepts and the division of sciences......Page 102
2.2. A troublesome emendation......Page 104
2.3. Abstraction and the qua-operator......Page 108
2.4. Aristotelian and Platonic separation......Page 110
2.5. Mathematical objects and concepts......Page 112
2.6. Linking abstractionM and induction?......Page 120
3. Universal concepts – induction (epagoge) and its different domains......Page 123
3.1. A general definition of induction......Page 124
3.2. Induction and its different domains......Page 125
3.3. The language of induction......Page 126
3.4.1. Induction in dialectical and rhetorical practice......Page 128
3.4.2. Digression: likeness and the charge of circularity......Page 131
3.4.3. Induction in ethics and natural science......Page 133
3.4.4. The troublesome case of ‘complete’ or ‘perfect induction’......Page 134
3.5. Induction and the starting points of syllogism......Page 137
4.1. Introduction......Page 140
4.2. What is the object of Analytica Posteriora II 19?......Page 141
4.3. Articulation and summary of the argument......Page 144
4.4. The relation of sense perception and intellect......Page 146
1. Alcinous between empiricism and recollection......Page 153
1.1. The doctrine of the doxastic logos......Page 154
1.2. Alcinous’ psychology......Page 156
1.3. Empiricism vs. innate knowledge......Page 159
2. Alexander of Aphrodisias & Porphyry on abstraction and universals......Page 166
2.1. Alexander – elaborating Aristotle’s notion of abstraction......Page 167
2.2. Neoplatonic readings of Alexander......Page 169
2.3. Immanent forms, definitional natures, and universal concepts......Page 173
2.4. A unitary theory of intellect?......Page 176
2.5. Porphyry – an abstractionist malgré lui?......Page 183
2.6. The ‘short commentary’ on Aristotle’s Categories......Page 184
2.7. The epistemological digression in the commentary on Ptolemy......Page 187
3. Plotinus – ‘Wegbereiter’ of Syrianus and Proclus......Page 196
3.1. The doctrine of the twofold nature of the logoi (I): logoi as criteria in perceptual judgements......Page 198
3.2. The doctrine of the twofold nature of the logoi (II): logoi as causes in matter......Page 203
3.3. Plotinus on innate knowledge and recollection......Page 207
1. Amicus Aristoteles, sed......Page 217
2. Syrianus’ and Proclus’ criticism of induction and abstraction......Page 220
2.1. Criticizing abstracted universals......Page 221
2.2. Who is the target of Syrianus’ and Proclus’ criticism?......Page 231
VI. The crucial role of doxastic concepts in Proclus’ epistemology......Page 235
1.1. Place and character of sense perception......Page 237
1.2. Olympiodorus on the ambiguity of sense perception......Page 239
1.3. Proclus on phantasia......Page 240
1.4. Phantasia and geometry......Page 242
1.5. Resume: sense perception, phantasia, and concept formation......Page 243
2.1. Unfair to Proclus? – Alleged inconsistencies in his theory of doxa......Page 244
2.2. More recent studies on Proclus’ theory of doxa......Page 245
2.3. Digression: doxa in Plato and Aristotle......Page 252
2.4. Proclus on doxa and innate knowledge......Page 255
2.5. Proclus on doxastic concepts (logoi doxastikoi)......Page 266
2.6. Doxa correcting sense perception......Page 272
VII. Proclus’ Platonic theory of concept attainment......Page 275
1.1. The discursive nature of soul: Proclus on dianoia......Page 276
1.2. Dianoia and the logoi of the soul......Page 277
1.3. Sources of Proclus’ doctrine of the psychic logoi......Page 280
1.4. Common notions and psychic logoi......Page 282
2.1. Recollection after Aristotle......Page 284
2.2. Forgetting......Page 286
2.3.1. The sources: Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, and Middle Platonism......Page 290
2.3.2. The Anonymous in Theaetetum (AT)......Page 294
2.3.3. Articulation: talent and error......Page 296
2.3.4. Proclus on articulation......Page 298
2.4. Probole......Page 301
2.4.1. Meaning and translation......Page 302
2.4.2. Probolē and geometry......Page 307
3. Proclus on learning and the acquisition of concepts......Page 311
3.1. Concept formation and the Platonic dialogue......Page 312
3.2. Recollection as an intentional act of the soul......Page 316
3.3. Different stages of recollection......Page 317
3.4. Different kinds of concepts......Page 321
3.5. A difficult passage......Page 325
3.6. Recollection and error......Page 329
3.7. Problematic concepts......Page 337
VIII. Plato and Aristotle in harmony? – Some conclusions......Page 347
1. Editions and translations......Page 355
2. Secondary literature......Page 367
1. Index nominum......Page 393
2. Index locorum......Page 395
3. Index rerum......Page 402
