A word of thanks
Introduction
1. ‘How comes the mind to be furnished?’
2. Survey of recent literature
3. Structure and contents of this study
I. Concepts – (ancient) problems and solutions
1. What is a concept?
2. The relevance of concepts in ancient epistemological debates
3. Different models of concept acquisition in antiquity
4. Forms and concepts & problematic concepts
II. Plato on learning as recollection
1. Forms and concepts
1.1. The role of concepts in Plato
1.2. Forms, concepts, language
2. The Parmenides and the archaeology of conceptualism
2.1. Concepts as ‘one over many’
2.2. Refuting conceptualism?
2.3. Conclusion
3. The Meno on the different stages of recollection
3.1. The transition from opinion (doxa) to knowledge
3.2. Conclusion
4. The Phaedo on the necessity of innate knowledge
4.1. The deficiency argument (Phaedo 72e–77a)
4.2. The continuity between Meno and Phaedo
5. The Phaedrus on acquiring universal concepts
5.1. Recollection and concept attainment (Phaedrus 249b–c)
5.2. Forms, concepts, language again
5.3. Conclusion
6. Concept formation and concepts in the Timaeus, Theaetetus, and Sophist
6.1. Recollection in Plato’s later works
6.2. Innateness and the structure of the human soul
7. The limits of recollection
7.1. Some problematic concepts
7.2. Recollection and error
8. Forms, concepts, and recollection
III. Aristotle’s reaction to Plato
1. Aristotle and his teacher Plato
1.1. A strange couple
1.2. Aristotle’s arguments against innate knowledge
2. The origin and nature of mathematical concepts
2.1. Concepts and the division of sciences
2.2. A troublesome emendation
2.3. Abstraction and the qua-operator
2.4. Aristotelian and Platonic separation
2.5. Mathematical objects and concepts
2.6. Linking abstractionM and induction?
3. Universal concepts – induction (epagoge) and its different domains
3.1. A general definition of induction
3.2. Induction and its different domains
3.3. The language of induction
3.4. Different kinds of induction in Aristotle
3.4.1. Induction in dialectical and rhetorical practice
3.4.2. Digression: likeness and the charge of circularity
3.4.3. Induction in ethics and natural science
3.4.4. The troublesome case of ‘complete’ or ‘perfect induction’
3.5. Induction and the starting points of syllogism
4. Induction of first principles (Posterior Analytics II 19)
4.1. Introduction
4.2. What is the object of Analytica Posteriora II 19?
4.3. Articulation and summary of the argument
4.4. The relation of sense perception and intellect
IV. Three case studies: Alcinous, Alexander & Porphyry, and Plotinus
1. Alcinous between empiricism and recollection
1.1. The doctrine of the doxastic logos
1.2. Alcinous’ psychology
1.3. Empiricism vs. innate knowledge
2. Alexander of Aphrodisias & Porphyry on abstraction and universals
2.1. Alexander – elaborating Aristotle’s notion of abstraction
2.2. Neoplatonic readings of Alexander
2.3. Immanent forms, definitional natures, and universal concepts
2.4. A unitary theory of intellect?
2.5. Porphyry – an abstractionist malgré lui?
2.6. The ‘short commentary’ on Aristotle’s Categories
2.7. The epistemological digression in the commentary on Ptolemy
3. Plotinus – ‘Wegbereiter’ of Syrianus and Proclus
3.1. The doctrine of the twofold nature of the logoi (I): logoi as criteria in perceptual judgements
3.2. The doctrine of the twofold nature of the logoi (II): logoi as causes in matter
3.3. Plotinus on innate knowledge and recollection
V. Syrianus’ and Proclus’ attitude towards Aristotle
1. Amicus Aristoteles, sed
2. Syrianus’ and Proclus’ criticism of induction and abstraction
2.1. Criticizing abstracted universals
2.2. Who is the target of Syrianus’ and Proclus’ criticism?
VI. The crucial role of doxastic concepts in Proclus’ epistemology
1. Proclus on sense perception and phantasia
1.1. Place and character of sense perception
1.2. Olympiodorus on the ambiguity of sense perception
1.3. Proclus on phantasia
1.4. Phantasia and geometry
1.5. Resume: sense perception, phantasia, and concept formation
2. An innovation by Proclus: his theory of doxa
2.1. Unfair to Proclus? – Alleged inconsistencies in his theory of doxa
2.2. More recent studies on Proclus’ theory of doxa
2.3. Digression: doxa in Plato and Aristotle
2.4. Proclus on doxa and innate knowledge
2.5. Proclus on doxastic concepts (logoi doxastikoi)
2.6. Doxa correcting sense perception
VII. Proclus’ Platonic theory of concept attainment
1. The soul and its innate knowledge
1.1. The discursive nature of soul: Proclus on dianoia
1.2. Dianoia and the logoi of the soul
1.3. Sources of Proclus’ doctrine of the psychic logoi
1.4. Common notions and psychic logoi
2. The triad of recollection: forgetting – articulation – probole
2.1. Recollection after Aristotle
2.2. Forgetting
2.3. Articulation (diarthrōsis)
2.3.1. The sources: Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, and Middle Platonism
2.3.2. The Anonymous in Theaetetum (AT)
2.3.3. Articulation: talent and error
2.3.4. Proclus on articulation
2.4. Probole
2.4.1. Meaning and translation
2.4.2. Probolē and geometry
2.4.3. Résumé
3. Proclus on learning and the acquisition of concepts
3.1. Concept formation and the Platonic dialogue
3.2. Recollection as an intentional act of the soul
3.3. Different stages of recollection
3.4. Different kinds of concepts
3.5. A difficult passage
3.6. Recollection and error
3.7. Problematic concepts
VIII. Plato and Aristotle in harmony? – Some conclusions
Bibliography
1. Editions and translations
2. Secondary literature
Indices
1. Index nominum
2. Index locorum
3. Index rerum
