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Decision-Making in Committees: Game-Theoretic Analysis

โœ Scribed by Nicola Friederike Maaser (auth.)


Publisher
Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg
Year
2010
Tongue
English
Leaves
140
Series
Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems 635
Edition
1
Category
Library

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โœฆ Synopsis


Political and economic institutions are typically governed by committees that face the challenge to reconcile the preferences of their members. How should decision rules be designed to generate fair and sustainable agreements, for example if committee members represent groups of different sizes? This book uses game-theoretic concepts and models to address the issue of political decision-making processes. In addition to providing a survey on basic game-theoretic tools in the analysis of political decisions, the author looks at specific issues such as two-tiered voting systems or the influence of lobbyists on legislative committees, and shows how the models can be applied to real-world contexts such as the EU decision-making institutions.

โœฆ Table of Contents


Front Matter....Pages 169-225
Games and Political Decisions....Pages 1-40
Committees as Representative Institutions....Pages 41-67
Robust Equal Representation....Pages 69-93
Committees and Lobby Coalition Formation....Pages 95-117
Back Matter....Pages 169-225

โœฆ Subjects


Game Theory/Mathematical Methods; Political Science; European Integration


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